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ABSTRACT—Today, an estimated 5400 people are civilly committed under 
state and federal sex offender programs. This Note surveys these civil 
commitment regimes and finds that seventeen jurisdictions (sixteen states 
and the federal government) have enacted legislative schemes that authorize 
the indefinite civil detention of people charged with, or previously convicted 
of, sex offenses to prisons or prison-like facilities—often for their entire 
lives. By charting the pervasiveness of sex offender civil commitment to 
prison, this Note provides new evidence that these sex offender civil 
commitment statutes are, in fact, punitive and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
Moreover, this Note argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson calls into question the Court’s logic in upholding sex offender 
civil commitment regimes in prior cases. Traditionally, civil commitment 
jurisprudence has turned on whether the legislature intends to punish—not 
merely confine—sex offenders. Kingsley, however, suggests that 
confinement may be found punitive based solely on the objective harshness 
of the conditions of incarceration, regardless of whether any state actor 
intended for the conditions to be punitive. If incarceration conditions may 
now constitute punishment regardless of governmental intent, it follows that 
the government may be punishing thousands of sex offenders without 
authorization. Indeed, as this Note shows, convicted prisoners and 
committed sex offenders commonly experience identical conditions of 
confinement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 1982, Illinois brought criminal charges against Terry B. 
Allen for “unlawful restraint” and “deviate sexual assault” of a woman.1 
After a preliminary hearing, the charges were dismissed for lack of probable 
cause.2 Nevertheless, Illinois subsequently filed a petition to declare Allen a 
“sexually dangerous person” and civilly commit him under its Sexually 
Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA).3 The trial court found Allen sexually 
 
 1 People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 692–93, 698 (Ill. 1985) (affirming the trial court’s determination 
that Allen met the definition of a sexually dangerous person beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of 
his incriminating statements made to two psychiatrists and his alleged victim’s testimony that he entered 
her car after a work shift without permission and forced her to perform oral sex in an airport parking lot). 
 2 Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986). 
 3 Id. at 365–66. The SDPA permits the State of Illinois to indefinitely confine all persons “suffering 
from a mental disorder” that has existed for at least one year prior, who have “criminal propensities to 
the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or 
acts of sexual molestation of children.” Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
205/1.01 (West 2017). Other states that also permit the indefinite civil commitment of sex offenders on 
the basis of charges alone—without a criminal conviction or adjudication of not guilty for reason of 
insanity or a finding of incompetence to stand trial—include Iowa and Kansas, which define “sexually 
violent predator” as someone “who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense,” 
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dangerous and committed him for an indeterminate period to the Menard 
Psychiatric Center, a mental health unit located inside a maximum-security 
prison.4 
Allen challenged the constitutionality of his indefinite “civil” detention 
in a maximum-security prison, arguing that such conditions amounted to 
criminal punishment and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination when it relied upon the testimony of his examining 
psychiatrist, who had elicited incriminating information from him.5 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held in a 5–4 decision that because the 
legislature intended to “treat” Allen rather than “punish[]” him, the 
proceedings against Allen were civil and not criminal, his Fifth Amendment 
rights were not violated, and his commitment was therefore constitutional.6
 Since Allen, federal courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality 
of sex offender civil commitment schemes on the basis that they are 
nonpunitive7—even when the civil committees in question find themselves, 
like Allen does, in prison indefinitely. Today, over thirty years after his case 
testing the constitutionality of sex offender civil commitment reached the 
Supreme Court, Terry Allen, a man who has never been criminally convicted 
of a sex crime, is still imprisoned in Illinois as a “Sexually Dangerous 
Person,” with no projected discharge date.8 He is nearly sixty.9 
An estimated 5400 people are civilly committed under state and federal 
sex offender programs.10 Twenty states, plus the District of Columbia and 
 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2008) (emphasis added); accord IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.4 (2014). See 
infra note 21 for a brief discussion of the post-conviction civil commitment statute that Illinois also 
employs. 
 4 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 366, 372. 
 5 See id. at 366. 
 6 See id. at 370, 373–75; see also Glen Elsasser, ‘Sexually Dangerous’ Rule is Upheld, CHI. TRIBUNE 
(July 2, 1986), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-07-02/news/8602170059_1_illinois-supreme-
court-sexual-assault-justices-byron-white [https://perma.cc/52CL-SG4B] (characterizing the Court’s 
decision in Allen as principally based on the rationale that because the State’s chief interest was the 
treatment, rather than punishment, of sex offenders, the Fifth Amendment does not apply to these 
proceedings). 
 7 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360–71 (1997) (holding that civil commitment, even 
if “predicated upon past conduct for which [the offender] has already been convicted and forced to serve 
a prison sentence,” does not constitute a second punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause); Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 276 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that conditions of 
civil committee in federal prison did not amount to impermissible punishment and thus did not “make out 
a constitutional violation”). 
 8 See ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., N31905 - Allen, Terry B., INMATE SEARCH, http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ 
subsections/search/inms_print.asp?idoc=N31905 [https://perma.cc/C6By-8349] (indicating that Allen is 
incarcerated at Big Muddy Correctional Center in Illinois as a Sexually Dangerous Person). 
 9 See id. 
 10 George Steptoe & Antoine Goldet, Why Some Young Sex Offenders Are Held Indefinitely, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 27, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/27/why-
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the federal government, have enacted legislation to confine “sexually 
dangerous” or “sexually violent” “persons,” “predators,” or “offenders.”11 
Although many provisions vary across jurisdictions, all of the legislative 
schemes authorize the indefinite civil detention of people charged with, or 
previously convicted of, sex offenses—often for their entire lives.12 Because 
sex offenders are a highly stigmatized group of people, the restrictive 
conditions under which many are civilly detained trigger little sympathy 
among most members of the public.13 And although sex offender civil 
committees are not the only type of civil committees that have been sent to 
prison—tuberculosis patients and drug addicts have also occasionally been 
 
some-young-sex-offenders-are-held-indefinitely [https://perma.cc/23CG-J5WE]. This statistic is likely 
an underestimate of the total population nationwide, as it only includes those people confined under 
“sexually violent predator programs,” which generally target post-conviction sex offenders, thus 
excluding “sexually dangerous persons” programs that generally target pre-conviction sex offenders. Id. 
See infra notes 20–28 and accompanying text for a discussion of this distinction. 
 11 Steptoe & Goldet, supra note 10 (citing 2015 program data from the State Civil Commitment 
Program Administrators, Society of Civil Commitment Professionals Network, and court data); see also 
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS (Aug. 
17, 2010), http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators [https://perma. 
cc/R78H-DZU6]. Jurisdictions that have such systems include: Arizona, California, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and the federal government. Steptoe & Goldet, supra. 
 12 Commentators and courts alike have noted that although civilly committed sex offenders have a 
right to be released upon a subsequent court finding of nondangerousness, the actual rates of release are 
so low that commitment often functions as a de facto life sentence. See, e.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. 
Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015) (noting that the Minnesota sex offender civil commitment program 
“has developed into indefinite and lifetime detention” because, “[s]ince the program’s inception in 1994, 
no committed individual has ever been fully discharged”), rev’d sub. nom., Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 
394 (8th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc denied, No. 15-3485 (Feb. 22, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106 
(2017); Anthony V. Salerno & Elana Goldstein, Predators’ Net, L.A. LAW., June 2009, at  32, 36 
(“Although committed offenders have the right to request a review of their commitment every 180 days, 
a civil commitment actually is akin to a life sentence because it is very difficult for offenders to be 
removed from the program.”). 
 13 The social stigma that convicted sex offenders face is widely documented. Even those that 
committed nonviolent offenses or have been assessed to be “low risk” are, by virtue of their legal status 
as a sex offender, often considered by the public to be “violent, dangerous, child molesters,” and 
consequently experience difficulty finding housing, employment, and forming social relationships. See 
Douglas N. Evans & Michelle A. Cubellis, Coping with Stigma: How Registered Sex Offenders Manage 
Their Public Identities, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 593, 594–95 (2015). This stigma is enhanced by mandatory 
public registration. Id. Media coverage of sex offenders often reflects this stigmatization; it is not difficult 
to find references to sex offenders describing them as “some of the nation’s most reviled citizens.” See 
Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Says Sex Offenders Can Access Social Media, USA TODAY (June 20, 2017, 
6:24 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/19/supreme-court-says-sex-
offenders-can-access-social-media/103006410 [https://perma.cc/5ZNL-ABYG]. 
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committed to jails and prisons—they are the group of civil committees most 
likely to be detained there.14 
Drawing on the fundamental “police power” of states to protect public 
health and safety,15 sex offender civil commitment programs ostensibly 
repudiate any punitive purpose in restraining a detainee’s liberty and instead 
predicate commitment on the dual goals of public safety from people found 
to be dangerous sexual predators and treatment of the offender.16 Although 
sex offender commitment programs are universally designated as being 
“civil” (as opposed to “criminal”) in nature—thereby avoiding the 
constitutional requirements attendant to criminal trials and sentences17—
people confined under these statutes are frequently committed to the long-
 
 14 Civil commitment to prison has been successfully challenged in the infectious disease and drug 
addiction contexts. Massachusetts, for example, sent civilly committed drug addicted women to prison 
for drug treatment instead of to a hospital facility for decades but recently passed a law banning this 
practice after the ACLU of Massachusetts filed a lawsuit. See Shira Schoenberg, Massachusetts Stops 
Sending Women Civilly Committed for Drug Abuse to Prison, MASSLIVE.COM (Jan. 25, 2016, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/01/massachusetts_stops_sending_wo.html 
[https://perma.cc/WZ2Y-MSYC]. Moreover, in 2007, the ACLU of Arizona sued Maricopa County for 
detaining a noncontagious tuberculosis patient in jail for over a year, triggering his eventual transfer to a 
specialized hospital in Denver for treatment. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of Arizona Lawsuit 
Triggers Transfer of TB Patient to Denver Hospital (July 17, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-
arizona-lawsuit-triggers-transfer-tb-patient-denver-hospital [https://perma.cc/G7LY-ETGB]. 
 15 This power was famously articulated in 1905 by the Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts: 
“According to settled principles the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such 
reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and 
the public safety.” 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
 16 See Ross A. Brennan, Note, Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually 
Violent Person Is in Illinois, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 558 (2011) (describing state’s pursuit of these two 
goals as together protecting society from dangerous individuals until they can be rehabilitated and 
released). 
 17 In many states, people facing sex offender civil commitment are entitled to some of the same 
procedural protections as criminal defendants, such as court-appointed counsel and a trial by jury. See, 
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.050 (West 2014) (“[A]ny person subject to this chapter shall be 
entitled to the assistance of counsel, and if the person is indigent . . . the court . . . shall appoint office of 
public defense contracted counsel to assist him or her.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.04–.05 (West 2007) 
(“If the person named in the petition claims or appears to be indigent, the court shall, prior to the probable 
cause hearing . . . refer the person to the authority for indigency determinations . . . and, if applicable, the 
appointment of counsel.”). But, that is not the case in all states. For example, many states do not require 
that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is “sexually dangerous” or “a sexually 
violent person.” See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 2014) (defining a “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard for sex offender civil commitment, as opposed to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard for criminal convictions). 
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term custody of prisons,18 or to secure standalone treatment facilities.19 Thus, 
many civilly committed sex offenders are detained in conditions that appear 
to be identical to those serving criminal sentences, but as a result of civil 
commitment proceedings that lack all the protections that accompany a 
criminal trial, and for conduct that would not always result in a criminal 
conviction. 
Most states aim to commit convicted sex offenders who are nearing the 
end of their criminal prison sentences;20 however, some states do not require 
a criminal conviction for commitment and instead seek to involuntarily 
commit people in lieu of criminal prosecution.21 As scholars have long 
recognized, both pre-conviction and post-conviction regimes raise thorny 
constitutional issues.22 Pre-conviction civil commitment has the potential to 
put a person in prison for life without a jury ever finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the alleged sex offenses took place at all.23 Indeed, the state may 
 
 18 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.34 (West 2016) (“The Department of Corrections shall be 
responsible for the operation of any facility designated for the custody, care and treatment of sexually 
violent predators, and shall provide or arrange for custodial care of persons committed pursuant to this 
act.”); see also infra Section I.B.1. 
 19 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44–48–100 (2018) (“At all times, a person committed for control, 
care, and treatment by the Department of Mental Health pursuant to this chapter must be kept in a secure 
facility, and the person must be segregated at all times from other patients under the supervision of the 
Department of Mental Health.”); see also infra Section I.B.2. 
 20 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11 (West 2015) (“If the court or jury determines that the 
person is a sexually violent predator, upon the expiration of the incarcerative portion of all criminal 
sentences . . . the person shall be committed to the custody of the department of corrections for control, 
care, and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so 
changed that the person no longer poses a potentially serious likelihood of danger to others.”). 
 21 See Brennan, supra note 16, at 557–58. Some states, such as Illinois, use both statutory regimes. 
The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act applies to those who have been charged with a sex offense. 
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01–12 (West 2017). In contrast, the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons 
Commitment Act applies to those who have been convicted of a sex-related offense and are about to be 
released from prison. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1–99 (West 2017). For additional examples, see 
supra note 3. 
 22 See, e.g., Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and 
Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 72 (1997) (arguing that sex offender civil 
commitment regimes “push the boundaries of standard civil commitment” and allow states to circumvent 
constitutional limitations of criminal incarceration and indefinitely, preventatively detain those who the 
state fears could commit future crimes); Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to 
Punish Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1205–11 (summarizing the expansive scholarly critique of 
the Court’s decision in Hendricks on the grounds that Kansas’s statute did, in fact, violate substantive due 
process in its ambiguous criteria for commitment and raising novel equal protection concerns about sex 
offender civil commitment). 
 23 In some states, however, a jury would have to find “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the person is 
a “sexually dangerous person” or “sexually violent person.” See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 
(2018) (“The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually 
violent predator.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (West 2008) (same). In other states, a jury need only 
find that the person is a sexually violent predator by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 394.917 (West 2018). 
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elect to initiate civil commitment proceedings against alleged sex offenders 
because it lacks enough evidence to criminally convict them. Post-conviction 
civil commitment, on the other hand, often constitutes a second, indefinite 
prison term that committees undergo after having already completed their 
criminal sentences.24 
The Supreme Court, however, has not been receptive to any challenges 
to the constitutionality of sex offender civil commitment regimes to date. In 
Allen v. Illinois,25 a pre-conviction statute survived a challenge that it 
“civilly” committed sex offenders to facilities with conditions that may 
amount to criminal punishment without providing all the safeguards 
attendant to a criminal trial.26 In Kansas v. Hendricks,27 a post-conviction 
statute withstood challenges that it violated the Constitution’s guarantees of 
due process and its prohibition against double jeopardy and ex post facto 
laws.28 Time and again, the linchpin of the statutes’ continued 
constitutionality in federal court has been the holding that the legislative 
regimes are properly classified as nonpunitive.29 The courts have done so in 
part by finding that a committee’s detention in prison or prison-like facilities 
is comparable to that experienced by “any involuntarily committed patient 
in the state mental institution”30 or that of a “pretrial detainee[].”31 
Legal scholars have frequently interrogated the constitutionality of state 
sex offender civil commitment regimes on several bases—from the 
questionable medical criteria and substantive legal standards under which 
sex offenders may be committed,32 to the failure to provide meaningful 
 
 24 Post-conviction statutes are thus uniquely vulnerable to double jeopardy and ex post facto 
challenges, to the extent that the civil commitment statutes arguably impose second criminal sentences 
and apply to people criminally convicted prior to their enactment. 
 25 478 U.S. 364 (1986); see also supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. 
 27 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 28 See id. at 360–71 (holding that civil commitment, even if “predicated upon past conduct for which 
[the offender] has already been convicted and forced to serve a prison sentence” and freshly imposed on 
a crime “already consummated,” does not constitute a second punishment in violation of the 
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy or Equal Protection Clauses). 
 29 See infra Part II. 
 30 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363. 
 31 Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 32 See, e.g., Janus, supra note 22, at 72 (“The questionable constitutionality of [sex offender civil 
commitment laws’] inadequately defined limits demands special justification or legitimization. . . . Sex 
offender commitments possess many of the qualities that elicit condemnation of ‘preventative 
detention.’”); Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
250, 265 (1998) (“Either most sexual predators are responsible and deserve punishment or most are not 
responsible and should not be punished. The concept of ‘mental abnormality’ the Court approved [in 
Hendricks] is so broad and vague that it sets no limit on the State’s ability to confine in the absence of 
culpability.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal 
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treatment.33 And although many scholars and jurists have questioned whether 
sex offender civil commitment is truly “civil” rather than “criminal,”34 there 
has been little work that squarely addresses the actual conditions under 
which sex offenders are civilly detained and the constitutional consequences 
of these arrangements.35 This Note contributes to the extant literature on sex 
offender civil commitment first by systematically examining the statutory 
landscape of sex offender civil commitment to prison and prison-like 
facilities in the United States, and second, by interrogating how the Court’s 
2015 decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson36 makes the objective conditions 
of sex offender civil commitment more constitutionally relevant than ever 
before. 
This Note argues that, because long-term incarceration in prison is the 
paradigmatic criminal sentence in the United States, sex offender civil 
commitment statutes that commit detainees to the custody of prison systems 
or treatment facilities that are so prison-like as to be essentially 
indistinguishable from prisons are, in fact, punitive. In other words, 
confining civilly committed sex offenders to prison and prison-like facilities 
is punishment—regardless of legislative intent—when the conditions of 
confinement are indistinguishable from the typical conditions of criminal 
incarceration (i.e., long-term confinement to a secure prison facility). And 
because such civil commitment schemes are punitive, they are illegal. Civilly 
 
Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
69, 94–95 (1996) (“SVP commitments should be impermissible in the absence of proof of mental 
illness . . . . [I]ndefinite regulatory confinement should never extend to individuals who are able to make 
choices and to decide whether to respond to sanctions. Preventative incapacitation of such individuals, as 
a substitute for reliance on the criminal process, is inconsistent with the core commitments of a free 
society . . . .”). 
 33 See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 78 (1999) (“Detention without the provision of realistic treatment 
opportunities and without the narrow tailoring that would promote as much liberty as possible indicates 
that this form of commitment is really nothing more than a fancy substitute for imprisonment.”); Jeslyn 
A. Miller, Note, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2093 passim 
(2010) (arguing that civilly committed sex offenders have a statutory and constitutional right to treatment, 
but that in reality treatment is inadequate). 
 34 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373, 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Kansas is not in 
fact “civilly” confining its sex offenders but instead inflicting criminal punishment, due, in large part, to 
lack of treatment and the commitment of sex offenders to a psychiatric wing of a prison hospital); LOÏC 
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 236 
(English language ed. 2009) (claiming that although sex offender civil committees are nominally 
“patients,” they are, in actuality, “subject to the state correctional authority and live under severe 
penitentiary regimens”); see also supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 35 But see, e.g., Cynthia A. Frezzo, Note, Treatment Under Razor Wire: Conditions of Confinement 
at the Moose Lake Sex Offender Treatment Facility, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 671–75 (2015) (detailing 
the punitive conditions of Minnesota’s sex offender civil commitment program and arguing that these 
conditions violate the Constitution’s Due Process Clause). 
 36 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
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committed sex offenders languish in prison before they have ever been 
convicted of a crime or after their criminal sentences have expired. This 
ongoing criminal punishment is imposed through civil proceedings that 
deprive sex offenders of the constitutional protections that must precede 
criminal punishment—including substantive due process, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and the prohibition of double jeopardy. 
Moreover, this Note contends that the logic of Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson,37 a recent Supreme Court decision concerning the rights of 
pretrial detainees, ought to be a game changer for civil commitment 
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has long held that sex offenders may be 
detained indefinitely without criminal process, even in conditions identical 
to convicted criminals, so long as they receive some civil process protections 
and so long as the legislature intends their incarceration to serve the interests 
of treatment and incapacitation, not punishment.38 Under this jurisprudence, 
courts have traditionally looked to the purpose of the incarceration—and not 
the conditions of incarceration—to decide whether the incarceration 
constitutes punishment.39 This logic dictates that if a civilly committed sex 
offender and a convicted prisoner are housed in the same prison under 
identical conditions, the civil committee is not being punished as long as the 
legislature did not intend for the civil commitment regime to constitute 
punishment. 
Kingsley, however, departs from this logic, and suggests that the 
objective conditions experienced by a prisoner can rise to the level of 
punishment even if no government actor intended to inflict punishment. In 
Kingsley, the Court held that the subjective standard applied to prisoners’ 
excessive force claims should not apply to those awaiting trial in jail; instead, 
a pretrial detainee “must show only that the force purposely or knowingly 
used against him was objectively unreasonable.”40 In effect, by lowering the 
standard of proof in excessive force cases, the Court in Kingsley took a 
harder look at the conditions to which those jailed before trial were subjected 
and added teeth to the longstanding rule that “a detainee may not be punished 
prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”41 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
 39 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (“The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or 
criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory construction.’ [Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)]. 
We must initially ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings. If so, 
we ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent.”). 
 40 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (emphasis added). 
 41 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
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If applied to sex offender civil commitment, the logic of Kingsley would 
suggest that a sex offender who experiences conditions of confinement 
tantamount to criminal incarceration is being punished even if the legislature 
has disclaimed the intent to inflict punishment through the civil commitment 
regime. In turn, the conclusion that incarceration in prison-like conditions 
constitutes punishment would result in the wholesale invalidation of many 
civil commitment statutes. This is because these statutes, as this Note’s 
legislative survey demonstrates, inflict prison-like incarceration without full-
blown criminal process, and it is well settled that criminal punishment 
without all the trappings of constitutional criminal procedure is unlawful.42 
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I surveys the nation’s sex 
offender civil commitment statutes, with a focus on those that permit the 
commitment of sex offenders to state departments of corrections. Through 
an analysis of lower court cases, it also examines the prison-like conditions 
at secure treatment facilities run by state health departments. Next, Part II 
presents an overview of the sex offender and civil commitment standards 
articulated by the Supreme Court, demonstrating that a critical assumption 
of this jurisprudence is that civil commitment is not punishment unless the 
government intends it as punishment. Finally, Part III discusses Kingsley and 
the circuit court cases following it43 as important recent developments in 
prisoners’ rights law that undermine that assumption. 
I. BEHIND PRISON WALLS: SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT  
IN PRACTICE 
Civil commitment is defined in large part by what it is not: a criminal 
sentence. Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defines civil commitment as 
“[a] court-ordered commitment of a person who is ill, incompetent, drug-
addicted, or the like, as contrasted with a criminal sentence.”44 In addition, 
it notes that “[u]nlike a criminal commitment, the length of a civil 
commitment is indefinite because it depends on the person’s recovery.”45 
Given the dictionary definition of civil commitment, and the constitutional 
jurisprudence surrounding it, it is oxymoronic that over half of those 
jurisdictions with sex offender civil commitment regimes permit 
 
 42 For a helpful analysis and summary of those distinctive constitutional protections attendant to 
criminal trials, see Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 81–82. 
 43 See, e.g., Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068–76 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
an objective standard applies to a pretrial detainee’s failure-to-protect claim against county jail). 
 44 Civil Commitment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 45 Id. (emphasis added). 
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commitment to the same type of facility that defines criminal punishment in 
the United States: prison.46 
This Part proceeds first by summarizing the results of a fifty-state 
survey that charts the legislative scope of sex offender civil commitment to 
prison. Second, this Part explores a typology that emerged from this survey 
of the types of facilities that state commitment statutes utilize for sex 
offender civil committees: 1) prison, 2) secure treatment centers, and 
3)  psychiatric programs. Using facts developed through litigation in various 
states, this Part also contends that standalone secure treatment centers are so 
punitive and prison-like as to also raise questions about their 
constitutionality. 
A. National Survey of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Statutes 
Socio-legal scholarship on sex offender laws has mainly focused on 
registration, notification, and other collateral consequences associated with 
a sex offense conviction.47 This is in large part because all states are required 
 
 46 Imprisonment has been the central mode of American criminal punishment since the early 1800s. 
See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 100, 100 (Norval Morris & David J. 
Rothman eds., 1998). The prison is generally considered to be a “modern” phenomenon, in that it has 
emerged relatively recently, see, e.g., JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRISONS 1 (1997) (“Imprisonment as a means of punishment is a relatively 
modern practice. Before the eighteenth century, offenders typically were sentenced to death, mutilation, 
branding, flogging, or banishment to a colonial territory—but they were seldom sentenced to confinement 
in a prison as punishment for their crimes.”), and is archetypical of modernity’s “political anatomy,” see 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 208 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d 
Vintage Books ed. 1995) (1977) (describing the decline of torture-as-spectacle, and the birth of the prison, 
as coextensive with the rise of a disciplinary mode of societal power relations). Nevertheless, prisons do 
have ancient roots. See ROBERTS, supra, at 2; Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient 
and Medieval Worlds, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra, at 3, 3–21. 
 47 See, e.g., DIANA RICKARD, SEX OFFENDERS, STIGMA, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 5–9 (2016) (focusing 
on community-dwelling child sex offenders’ management of stigma and other collateral consequences of 
their convictions, notably registration and community notifications requirements); Catherine L. Carpenter 
& Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1132 (2011) (arguing that increasingly harsh state registration and notification 
laws are indeed punitive and thus unconstitutional); Bob Edward Vásquez, Sean Maddan & Jeffery T. 
Walker, The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in the United States: A Time-
Series Analysis, 54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 175, 185–89 (2008) (examining the impact of sex offender 
registration and notification systems on the incidence of forcible rapes). But see Mona Lynch, Pedophiles 
and Cyber-predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary 
Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 537 (2002) 
(noting that post-conviction civil commitment schemes constitute even more restrictive legislative 
measures than the expansive surveillance methods accompanying registration and notification databases); 
Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 452, 456–59 (1998) (discussing how, in addition to registration and notification requirements, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, which authorized sex offender civil commitment 
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to have sex offender registries and notification laws pursuant to the federal 
Adam Walsh Act.48 Less attention has been paid to cross-state comparisons 
of state civil commitment schemes that are implemented against sex 
offenders. 
Nevertheless, there have been some important studies that survey sex 
offender civil commitment statutes and programs nationwide.49 Researchers 
have identified different types of facilities that sex offenders are committed 
to in various states: state hospitals, freestanding treatment facilities, and 
programs within prisons.50 The potential legal implications of such practices 
have been raised but not fully explored.51 This Note systematically examines 
the legislative landscape of sex offender civil commitment to prisons in the 
United States through a nationwide survey of commitment statutes.52 The 
results of this survey are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix. 
 The survey confirmed that only twenty-two jurisdictions (twenty states, 
the federal government, and the District of Columbia) have specialized civil 
commitment statutes for “sexually dangerous” or “sexually violent” 
persons.53 Of these, the results demonstrate that five states—Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and North Dakota—explicitly 
 
to prison on the basis of mental abnormality versus mental illness, reflects a broader penological transition 
from a focus on individual “transformation” to “management” of high-risk, “monstrous” populations). 
 48 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 34 U.S.C and 
42 U.S.C.). Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act in 2006, and the law requires each jurisdiction of the 
United States to maintain a sex offender registry. 34 U.S.C. § 20912 (2012). The Act was in some ways 
redundant legislation; it followed two earlier federal statutes, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, which withheld federal money from states that 
did not create sex offender registries, and “Megan’s Law,” which amended the previous law to require 
state registration systems in 1996. See Lynch, supra note 47, at 538, 541–42. 
 49 See, e.g., Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices, 
Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439 (2008) (summarizing available 
survey data on sex offender civil commitment programs); Miller, supra note 33, at 2128 (surveying 
varying procedural protections in state sex offender civil commitment statutes). 
 50 See Deming, supra note 49, at 444–45. 
 51 Id. at 445. 
 52 Although other sex offender civil commitment statutory surveys have been conducted, this was 
the first to focus specifically on whether state statutes authorize sex offender civil commitment to prison. 
To begin, preexisting compilations of state statutory civil commitment schemes were consulted. See 
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS (2012). Second, Westlaw’s 
annotated state statutory compilations for each state were searched using the terms: (“sex offense” AND 
“civil commitment”) and (“sexually violent”) and (“sexually dangerous”) in August 2017 to locate any 
and all state (including the District of Columbia) and federal civil commitment statutes. Each statute was 
then analyzed to assess the type of facility to which sex offenders were committed. 
 53 See infra Appendix tbl.1; see also Steptoe & Goldet, supra note 10. All fifty states have some kind 
of general civil commitment statute providing for the involuntary hospitalization of the dangerously 
mentally ill. Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 
1202 (1974) (collecting state statutes). In addition, because of federal law, all states have sex offender 
registration laws. See supra note 48. 
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authorize sex offender civil commitment to their respective departments of 
corrections.54 In addition, although the federal government’s statute does not 
specify which type of facility is permissible for the detainment of its civil 
committees, court documents reveal that those committed under the Adam 
Walsh Act are committed to a special unit of a federal prison in North 
Carolina.55 
 Eight additional states—Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New York, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin—commit sex offenders to state 
health or human services departments but authorize these agencies to 
contract with their respective departments of corrections or private 
companies to detain committees.56 Although some statutes that directly 
commit or permit commitment to prison contain language requiring civil 
committees be kept separate or segregated from criminally convicted 
inmates except for incidental contact,57 none appear to specify that civil 
committees must receive more comfortable or less restrictive treatment than 
their criminally convicted counterparts.58 Furthermore, Minnesota, Illinois, 
Washington, and Texas authorize commitment of some sex offenders to 
secure treatment centers separate from both their health departments and 
their departments of corrections.59 
There are, however, five jurisdictions with sex offender civil 
commitment statutes that do take, at least facially, a more traditional civil 
commitment approach. Arizona, for example, commits sex offenders to a 
state hospital or to a less restrictive alternative.60 California, Washington, 
 
 54 See infra Appendix tbl.1 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/8 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
123A, § 2 (West 2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 135-E:11 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.34 
(West 2016); and N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-03.3-13–14 (West 2008)). 
 55 See Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing civil committees’ 
interactions with criminal prisoners, subjection to strip searches, lack of rehabilitation opportunities, and 
mail inspection). 
 56 See infra Appendix tbl.1 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917 (West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 229A.7 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 
2014); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.10 (McKinney 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100 (2018); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37.2-909 (West 2018); and WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.06–.065 (West 2007)). 
 57 For example, the Virginia statute states: “At all times, respondents committed for control, care, 
and treatment by the Department pursuant to this chapter shall be kept in a secure facility. Respondents 
committed under this chapter shall be segregated by sight and sound at all times from prisoners in the 
custody of a correctional facility.” VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-909. 
 58 This standard, that civil committees are owed “more considerate treatment” than their criminally 
convicted counterparts, comes from an early Supreme Court civil commitment case, Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982), which is discussed infra Section II.A. 
 59 See infra Appendix tbl.1 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/40 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. § 
253D.07 (West 2015); and WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (West 2014)). Texas has a system with tiered 
options of restrictiveness, from total confinement to outpatient civil commitment. See id. (citing TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.0831 (West 2017)). 
 60 See id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707 (2016)). 
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D.C., and Nebraska commit their sex offenders to state hospital systems.61 
Pennsylvania commits its detainees to an inpatient treatment facility 
operated by the Department of Public Welfare.62 
In sum, seventeen of the twenty-two jurisdictions with specialized civil 
commitment statutes for sex offenders permit civil commitment to prison or 
prison-like facilities.63 On one end of the restrictiveness spectrum, there are 
statutes that commit civil detainees to prison (or explicitly authorize such an 
arrangement). On the other end of the spectrum are more traditional civil 
commitment arrangements, in hospital or outpatient settings. In the middle 
are statutes that authorize civil commitment to separate secure treatment 
facilities. The next Section examines each type in turn. 
B. Prisons, Secure Treatment Facilities, and Psychiatric Programs 
This Section explores what these three general types of facilities—
prisons, secure treatment centers, and mental health facilities—look like in 
practice through the eyes of district and appellate courts that have considered 
challenges from sex offender civil committees.64 
1. Prisons 
Numerous civilly committed sex offenders in the United States are 
confined to a state or federal prison—facilities traditionally reserved for the 
punitive confinement of those adjudicated guilty by a criminal court.65 And 
there is little doubt that prison conditions are highly punitive. Scholars 
studying mass incarceration have concluded that with the dramatic rise in 
prison populations since the 1970s, there has also been a substantial increase 
in the punitive nature of prison policy.66 The basic restrictions on freedom of 
 
 61 See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3808 (West 2017); 
and NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1209 (West 2009)). 
 62 See id. (citing 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6403 (West 2018)). 
63 An important note about these counts is that this survey assessed the statutory authorization for 
commitment to various facility types. The extent to which each jurisdiction actually utilizes the full 
breadth of its statutory authority to commit sex offenders to prison-like facilities requires further research. 
In addition, Illinois is listed twice above because it has two separate civil commitment statutes, one for 
pre-conviction and one for post-conviction sex offenders, but it is counted just once here because both 
programs can be classified as being either “prison” or “prison-like.” See infra note 153 (providing a 
description of Illinois’s two regimes of sex offender civil commitment). 
 64 The facts from the below cases provide a small window into life inside the various types of 
facilities civilly committed sex offenders find themselves in. Nevertheless, whether civil commitment to 
prison, secure treatment centers, and mental hospitals can be meaningfully distinguished with regard to 
the facilities’ actual punitiveness remains an open empirical question. 
 65 Quantifying how many sex offender civil committees are confined in each type of facility is outside 
the scope of this Note but is an important avenue for future research. 
 66 See, e.g., MONA LYNCH, SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
PUNISHMENT 3 (2010) (noting that contemporary prisons “aim to punish more deeply than the sentence 
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movement, information, and association that prisoners face in such “closed 
institutions” must be emphasized.67 Today, prisons are chronically 
overcrowded, rape and forced sexual conduct are commonplace, and 
prisoner healthcare is often grossly inadequate.68 Furthermore, for a subset 
of these committees, this arrangement means they are receiving sex offender 
treatment from mental health staff who treat criminally convicted inmates as 
well.69 This raises the critical question of whether it is possible to create a 
treatment atmosphere that is meaningfully oriented toward recovery and 
release within an institution that has no such general mandate.70 
Civilly committed prisoners often do not experience fewer restrictions 
than their criminally convicted counterparts, even if they are housed in 
separate units. Indeed, they may even experience harsher conditions of 
confinement. For example, Thomas Matherly, a sex offender civil committee 
incarcerated in a federal prison in North Carolina, challenged his 
confinement by pointing out the similarities in treatment that he received to 
those prisoners serving criminal sentences and the ways in which his 
treatment was more harsh.71 Like its treatment of his criminally sentenced 
counterparts, the state confined Matherly to a double-bunked cell, forced him 
to wear the prison uniform, restricted his purchases to only select items from 
the prison commissary, restricted the television programs he could watch, 
and screened all of his incoming and outgoing mail.72 He and the other civil 
committees were also, like other prisoners, subject to invasive strip-searches 
 
of imprisonment itself” with the rise of hard labor requirements, return of chain gangs, expanded use of 
solitary confinement, removal of recreation, and elimination of inmate programs); Jonathan Simon, Rise 
of the Carceral State, 74 SOC. RES. 471, 494 (2007) (describing the rise of the carceral state and its 
corollary “warehouse prison” since the 1980s, where “incapacitation” has replaced rehabilitation as the 
primary rationale for punishment). But see Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The 
Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 33, 55–56 (2011) 
(arguing that although penal rhetoric became more punitive in the 1970s, rehabilitative programming in 
prisons did not begin to decline until the 1990s, and even then, it did not result in total elimination of 
programming). 
 67 See Dirk van Zyl Smit, Regulation of Prison Conditions, 39 CRIME & JUST. 503, 503–04 (2010) 
(“Prisons are closed institutions. They are established and funded by governments to hold people against 
their will. In the case of sentenced prisoners at least, this loss of liberty is a deliberately inflicted 
punishment. . . . In the process of imprisonment the prison authorities exercise direct and enormous power 
over those who are imprisoned.”). 
 68 Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 
887–88 (2009). 
 69 As discussed infra in Part II, sex offender treatment is constitutionally mandated. 
 70 Sex offender treatment standards recommend that therapy be treatment-oriented and nonpunitive, 
which requires a “treatment environment with adequate space, staff behavior that is therapeutic and 
professional, [and] facility policies that reflect a therapeutic stance toward residents” that may be difficult, 
or impossible, to find in even the mental health wards of state prisons. See Deming, supra note 49, at 445. 
 71 See Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 72 Id. 
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and cell shake-downs.73 However, Matherly faced additional stigmatization 
as a sex offender in prison in the form of harassment upon interaction with 
other prisoners.74 Moreover, unlike the other prisoners, he was not given 
access to rehabilitative groups, such as Alcoholics Anonymous and 
vocational programs.75 Similar conditions have been emphasized by 
plaintiffs challenging the conditions of their civil commitment to state prison 
in other states, such as in Illinois.76 
2. Secure Treatment Centers 
Sex offenders committed to secure treatment facilities often do not fare 
much better. Many of the sex offenders who avoid civil commitment to 
prison nevertheless find themselves in prison-like secure treatment facilities. 
For example, in Hargett v. Adams,77 the ACLU of Illinois represented a class 
of sex offenders detained under the state’s post-conviction civil commitment 
statute challenging the constitutionality of the prison-like conditions at a 
state health department-run secure treatment facility.78 The plaintiffs argued 
that their substantive due process rights were violated because their 
conditions of confinement constituted a punitive “prison-like environment” 
that was “counter-therapeutic,” in that they sustained “excessive restrictions 
on personal movement,” and their treatment was inadequate.79 
The Hargett court described similarities between the treatment facility 
and high-security prisons, including: numerous guard and observation posts, 
a central security system, continually-locked doors, small prison-like rooms, 
invasive searches, and significant restrictions on movement.80 The court even 
found that “[m]any of the practices pertaining to restrictions on 
movement . . . were imported wholesale from practices established through 
the Department of Corrections.”81 And yet, although the court acknowledged 
that the “level of restrictions may [have been] excessive in light of this 
patient population,” the court held that because the restrictions “[were] not 
substantial departures from accepted professional judgment and standards,” 
 
 73 Id. at 269, 271. 
 74 Id. For a vivid description of the violence that sex offenders may be subjected to on account of 
being housed with pretrial criminal defendants, see King v. County of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 554–
55 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 75 Matherly, 859 F.3d at 269, 272. 
 76 See, for example, Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2003), which is discussed infra in 
Section II.D, for an account of another unsuccessful challenge to the conditions of sex offender civil 
commitment in prison. 
 77 No. 02 C 1456, 2005 WL 399300 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2005). 
 78 See id. at *1. 
 79 Id. at *1–2. 
 80 Id. at *2. 
 81 Id. 
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they were constitutional.82 Critical to the court’s holding that the conditions 
of confinement were nonpunitive, and therefore constitutional, was the 
assumption that restrictions the court found to be objectively “excessive” did 
not amount to impermissible punishment. 
Thus, the “high-security, prison-like”83 nature of Illinois’s treatment 
facility could be considered even more restrictive than the environment at 
some minimum-security prisons. In fact, some of the more egregious civil 
commitment systems, such as Minnesota’s system, utilized secure treatment 
facilities and did not house its detainees in state prisons.84 The plaintiffs in a 
recent Minnesota case, Karsjens v. Jesson,85 in which the district court found 
the civil commitment system unconstitutional, alleged that the executive 
director of the state sex offender program implemented policies of a 
maximum-security prison facility.86 These policies included: “restricted 
visitation, restricted property rights, censored mail, monitored calls, 
restricted personal physical movement, unreasonable searches, and 
discipline without due process of law.”87 Together, the plaintiffs claimed, 
these practices went “beyond the scope of what is necessary for treating 
Plaintiffs and Class members in a therapeutic manner” or “to maintain 
control or security of the facility,” and instead created a “hostile environment 
that encourage[d] a sense of hopelessness, powerlessness, and fear.”88 After 
subjecting Minnesota’s statutory scheme to strict scrutiny, the district court 
found the statute unconstitutional89—a decision recently overturned, 
however, by the Eighth Circuit.90 Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
 
 82 Id. at *16. Although the court noted that “[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to ‘more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions 
of confinement are designed to punish,’” it also emphasized that only minimal standards of care, rather 
than optimal standards of care, are constitutionally required. Id. at *13. 
 83 Id. at *2. 
 84 See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub. nom., Karsjens v. Piper, 
845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc denied, No. 15-3485 (Feb. 22, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
106 (2017). One commentator has described Minnesota’s secure treatment facility, Moose Lake, as a 
“domestic Guantanamo,” given its harsh conditions and extremely low rate of release. Frezzo, supra note 
35, at 664. 
 85 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. 
 86 Third Amended Complaint at 23, Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (No. 11-cv-03659-DWF-JJK). 
 87 See id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 The district court’s rationale was not based on the notion that the civil committees were 
unconstitutionally subject to punishment, but instead that the State’s program was not narrowly tailored 
to achieve its compelling state interests, in large part because it failed to conduct periodic risk assessments 
that would permit some committees to be released. See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168. 
 90 See Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 407–08 (8th Cir. 2017) (disagreeing with the district court’s 
application of the strict scrutiny standard and finding that the proper standard is whether the act “bears a 
rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose”). 
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distinguish the inherently punitive nature of prisons from prison-like 
facilities, such as those at issue in Hargett and Karsjens, statutes that commit 
civil detainees to secure treatment facilities are likely vulnerable to the same 
constitutional challenge as those that commit detainees expressly to prisons. 
3. Psychiatric Programs 
There are alternatives to sex offender civil commitment to prison. Some 
states’ civil commitment statutes prohibit commitment to both prisons and 
prison-like facilities. California, for example, commits its “sexually violent 
predators” to the Coalinga state mental hospital, where they reside alongside 
other psychiatric patients in a treatment-oriented institutional setting.91  
Historically, Texas utilized exclusively psychiatric outpatient commitment 
as part of its commitment scheme, although in recent years it has primarily 
confined its committees to a secure facility.92 The Hargett court even 
acknowledged the existence of other types of treatment facilities, like one 
that “provided a significantly less-restrictive environment” than Illinois’s, 
without suffering from “significantly greater assaultive behavior from its 
patients.”93 
Moreover, the thirty states that do not have sex offender civil 
commitment statutes at all presumably use involuntary psychiatric 
hospitalization for those offenders meeting the general civil commitment 
statutory criteria. These civil commitment regimes more closely resemble 
the type of civil commitment used for those committed under involuntary 
psychiatric hospitalization statutes and are also more in line with what the 
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, an international 
organization of over 2000 sex offender treatment providers and researchers, 
recommends.94 However, whether it is wise to draw a firm distinction 
 
91 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (2018); Department of State Hospitals – Coalinga, 
CA.GOV, http://www.dsh.ca.gov/coalinga [https://perma.cc/8XUX-H5XE] (listing the patient 
population of the state hospital); see also King v. County of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 555–56 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (describing the relatively favorable conditions at Coalinga).  
 92 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.0831 (West 2017). Now, however, Texas also does 
use inpatient sex offender commitment to a secure facility. See Betsy Blaney, Texas Trying Revamped 
Sex Offender Treatment Program, STATESMAN (updated May 30, 2016), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/state--regional/texas-trying-revamped-sex-offender-treatment-
program/ajJjpwcrUlPmbXZCLEKMLM [https://perma.cc/XXP7-XC3A] (describing the state’s overhaul 
of its sex offender civil commitment regime in the wake of an investigation that found its prior program 
had been both ineffective and poorly managed, with not a single committee reentering the broader 
community). 
 93 Hargett v. Adams, No. 02 C 1456, 2005 WL 399300, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2005). Ironically, the 
Hargett court cited the sex offender treatment program in Minnesota at issue in Karsjens v. Jesson as an 
example of a substantially less-restrictive alternative. 
 94 ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, supra note 11 (“If a state chooses to enact a 
civil commitment law, the resulting civil commitment treatment program should be housed in a treatment-
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between prison-like confinement and psychiatric confinement in terms of 
levels of restrictiveness, or even social causes or effects, will depend on 
further empirical research.95 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE CONDITIONS OF SEX 
OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT 
Every day, state and federal authorities detain people who are not 
convicted criminals—undocumented immigrants, pretrial detainees, and 
civil committees—for extensive periods of time in secure facilities. This Part 
begins with a discussion of the existing legal architecture that constrains civil 
commitment and other civil detention schemes more generally. Next, it 
delves into three of the major Supreme Court cases that have considered the 
constitutionality of sex offender civil commitment statutes: Allen v. Illinois,96 
Kansas v. Hendricks,97 and Seling v. Young.98 Finally, it considers how the 
Ninth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Fourth Circuit have diverged with respect 
to whether sex offender civil commitment to prison might be found to be 
punitive and thus unconstitutional. 
A. Civil Detention, Civil Commitment, and the State’s 
 “Nonpunitive” Purpose 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly approved civil detention schemes in 
the pretrial and civil commitment contexts, so long as an important 
constitutional precondition is met: that the significant restraint of personal 
liberty that civil detention entails is imposed with a “nonpunitive” 
governmental purpose.99 After all, civil detention may, in some cases, be 
 
oriented facility that is structurally similar, but physically separate, from other programs for the mentally 
ill.”). 
 95 For example, an empirical study by Professor Bernard Harcourt that analyzed rates of mental 
hospitalization and imprisonment over the latter half of the twentieth century demonstrates the analytical 
leverage obtained by operationalizing both types of confinement together as one rate of societal 
“institutionalization.” See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the 
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1776 (2006) (finding that when “hospitalization and 
prison rates are aggregated” it becomes clear that the United States “is only now beginning to reach the 
levels of institutionalization that were commonplace from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s”). He argues 
that both psychiatric commitment and imprisonment are forms of “institutional incapacitation” that have 
the function of spatial exclusion and confinement of marginal populations. Id. at 1784. 
 96 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 97 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 98 531 U.S. 250 (2000). 
 99 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (finding that psychiatric civil committees 
must not be punished); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (finding that mentally retarded 
civil committees may not be held in conditions that amount to punishment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 535 (1979) (finding that pretrial detention must not amount to punishment of the detainee and 
restrictions on detainee liberty must have a nonpunitive purpose). 
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indefinite and effected without many of the substantive and procedural 
protections that must precede the imposition of criminal sentences.100 What 
sets civil commitment apart from other forms of civil detention is that the 
requisite nonpunitive governmental purpose is to protect the public, or the 
individual, from the potential harm imposed by an individual’s mental 
abnormality,101 and the detention promises to provide treatment or care to 
promote recovery where possible.102 In the United States, individuals may be 
civilly committed to a hospital or other facility if they are found to be 
dangerously mentally ill and to pose a threat to themselves or others, are 
sexually dangerous, are mentally incompetent and unable to care for 
themselves, or even, more recently, if they are addicted to certain 
substances.103 The involuntary institutionalization of the mentally ill in 
psychiatric hospitals is the classic civil commitment case that most often 
draws the public’s attention and concern.104 
In Bell v. Wolfish,105 a landmark case considering the rights of pretrial 
detainees, the Court articulated a clear principle to assess whether pretrial 
detention conditions comport with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
protection against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law: 
“whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”106 At the 
same time, the Court carved out a sizeable exception: institutional security.107 
 
 100 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 101 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, 
is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have 
sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of 
some additional factor, such as ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’ . . .  The precommitment 
requirement of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ is consistent with the requirements of 
these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to 
those who are unable to control their dangerousness.” (citations omitted)). 
 102 Cf. id. at 366 (“While we have upheld state civil commitment statutes that aim both to incapacitate 
and to treat, see [Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986)], we have never held that the Constitution prevents 
a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a 
danger to others.”). 
 103 Christopher Moraff, New Laws Force Drug Users into Rehab Against Their Will, DAILY BEAST 
(May 19, 2017, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/new-laws-force-drug-users-into-rehab-against-
their-will [https://perma.cc/CCE2-W9QS]. Over thirty states have laws that permit brief civil detainment 
of drug users, but more recently, in at least eight states, including Pennsylvania, Michigan, and New 
Jersey, lawmakers are hoping to expand the drug user civil commitment to ninety days. Id. 
 104 The deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States culminated in a 
massive reduction in state mental hospitals and state institutions for people with developmental 
disabilities and garnered significant public attention. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of 
Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7 (2012). 
 105 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 106 Id. at 535. 
 107 See id. at 540 (“Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining 
jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting 
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The Court suggested in Bell that, barring an express intent to punish, courts 
should look at whether the restriction on a civil detainee bears any reasonable 
relation to a legitimate (i.e., nonpunitive) goal, such as maintaining jail 
security.108 Thus, while Bell affirmed that pretrial detainees cannot 
constitutionally be subjected to punishment, it also left room open for 
excessive restrictions on civil detainees based on a reasonable relation 
standard. 
Civil commitment cases outside of the sex offender context that have 
reached the Supreme Court also emphasize the mandatorily nonpunitive 
nature of commitment. In Youngberg v. Romeo,109 the Court articulated the 
substantive rights, in addition to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and 
medical care, that a civil committee is entitled to under the Due Process 
Clause: safety and freedom from unnecessary bodily restraints.110 Although 
the detainee in Youngberg was a developmentally disabled adult man,111 the 
Court’s holdings were not limited to this type of case, and it spoke in broad 
terms about the constitutionally mandated conditions the State must secure 
for involuntarily committed people when it stated that “[p]ersons who have 
been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement 
are designed to punish.”112 At the same time, Youngberg tempered its strong 
statement of the rights of civil committees when it adopted a “professional 
judgment” standard wherein restrictions on civil committees are considered 
presumptively “reasonable,” and thus constitutional, when they are 
supported by the exercise of professional judgment.113 
 
and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting 
trial.”). 
 108 Id. at 539 (“[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is 
arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is 
punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). 
 109 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 110 See id. at 324. 
 111 See id. at 309. 
 112 See id. at 321–22. Intriguingly, the Court came to this position in part by recognizing the rights 
of criminally convicted prisoners. The Court stated, “If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold 
convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily 
committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe conditions.” Id. at 315–16. This statement 
suggests that prisoners’ rights litigation will occasionally presage the declaration of substantive due 
process rights for civil committees of various kinds. Further, it may lend support to this Note’s argument: 
that Kingsley v. Hendrickson, a pretrial detainee case, could have a bearing on sex offender civil 
commitment cases. 
 113 Id. at 321–23. 
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In Foucha v. Louisiana,114 another leading civil commitment case, the 
Court reiterated the rule that, if a plaintiff has not been convicted of any 
crime, “he may not be punished.”115 It then went on to emphasize that, to be 
consistent with the Due Process Clause, the nature of commitment must 
“bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed.”116 Together, Bell, Foucha, and Youngberg make clear a 
constitutional imperative: civil detainees of all stripes may not be punished 
and the conditions in which they are held must be reasonably related to a 
nonpunitive state objective. 
B. Legislative Intent and the Questionable Constitutionality of Sex 
Offender Civil Commitment 
This Section delves into several of the Supreme Court’s major sex 
offender civil commitment decisions to demonstrate how in each case, 
beginning with Allen,117 the Court has narrowly upheld the commitment 
statutes as “nonpunitive” (despite actual evidence to the contrary). The Court 
has done so by employing a narrow focus on legislative intent instead of a 
focus on the actual, objective conditions of civil committee confinement. 
In Allen v. Illinois, as discussed in the Introduction, a divided Supreme 
Court upheld the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA) from a 
constitutional challenge that it amounted to unconstitutional criminal 
punishment in circumvention of the procedural protections guaranteed to 
criminal defendants.118 Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held 
that the ostensibly “civil” proceedings created under SDPA—which are 
triggered by criminal charges and nonetheless result in incarceration in 
prison—should indeed be considered truly nonpunitive, and noncriminal.  
The Court cited four reasons. First, that in the language of the Act, 
which required the state to care for and treat sexually dangerous persons,119 
“the State has disavowed any interest in punishment.”120 Second, that despite 
 
 114 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
 115 Id. at 80. 
 116 See id. at 79 (citations omitted). 
 117 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 118 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 119 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8 (West 2017) (“If the respondent is found to be a sexually 
dangerous person then the court shall appoint the Director of Corrections guardian of the person found to 
be sexually dangerous . . . . The Director of Corrections as guardian shall keep safely the person so 
committed until the person has recovered and is released as hereinafter provided. The Director of 
Corrections as guardian shall provide care and treatment for the person committed to him designed to 
effect recovery.”). 
 120 Allen, 478 U.S. at 370. The Court went on to further specify that the Act did not appear to promote 
what it characterized as the two “traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence.” Id. 
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the requirement that at least one act of sexual assault be proved as an 
antecedent to commitment, this factual finding was sought not to punish past 
misdeeds, but to help the court predict future behavior.121 Third, that the 
procedural safeguards of SDPA resemble those of a criminal proceeding, 
such as the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and the burden of persuasion being “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”122 And fourth, the Court brushed aside any serious consideration of 
the objective conditions of Allen’s confinement—namely their identity with 
those of his criminally convicted counterparts—by stating that Allen’s 
incarceration in a prison did “not transform the State’s intent to treat into an 
intent to punish” because sexually dangerous persons were treated like other 
felons with a need for psychiatric care, not as “ordinary prisoners.”123 
Since deciding Allen, the Supreme Court has also upheld the state sex 
offender civil commitment statutes of Kansas and Washington against 
challenges that they violate constitutional prohibitions against double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws and constitutional guarantees of substantive 
due process for civil commitment.124 In these cases, as in Allen, the Court 
upheld each civil commitment regime it found to impose “civil” restraints 
rather than criminal punishment. For instance, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the 
Court found that the Kansas statute was nonpunitive because the state 
disavowed a punitive intent, limited its application to only particularly 
dangerous individuals, provided strict procedural safeguards, kept detainees 
segregated from the general prison population and afforded the same status 
as others who have been civilly committed, provided treatment if possible, 
 
However, the Court has considered incapacitation and treatment to both be legitimate aims of civil 
confinement, as well as criminal punishment. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365–66 (1997). 
 121 Allen, 478 U.S. at 371. 
 122 Id. at 371–72. 
 123 Id. at 373–74. The dissenting Justices, in an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
recounted the same facts and came to an opposite conclusion: 
Thus, the Illinois “sexually dangerous person” proceeding may only be triggered by a criminal 
incident; may only be initiated by the sovereign State’s prosecuting authorities; may only be 
established with the burden of proof applicable to the criminal law; may only proceed if a criminal 
offense is established; and has the consequence of incarceration in the State’s prison system—in 
this case, Illinois’ maximum-security prison at Menard. It seems quite clear to me, in view of the 
consequences of conviction and the heavy reliance on the criminal justice system—for its definition 
of the prohibited conduct, for the discretion of the prosecutor, for the standard of proof, and for the 
Director of Corrections as custodian—that the proceeding must be considered ‘criminal’ for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 124 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (holding that Kansas’s civil commitment statute 
comports with the requirements of substantive due process so long as there is a determination that the 
offender has some lack of control over his or her behavior); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001) 
(holding that Washington’s commitment statute, once found to be civil, “cannot be deemed punitive ‘as 
applied’” to an individual); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (holding that Kansas’s civil commitment statute 
was nonpunitive, which precluded plaintiff’s double jeopardy and ex post facto claims). 
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and permitted immediate release if the detainee was shown to be 
nondangerous.125 Again, as in Allen, the Court’s determination that the 
proceedings engendered by the Kansas statute were indeed civil (and not 
criminal) disposed of the plaintiff’s constitutional double jeopardy and ex 
post facto claims.126 In Seling v. Young,127 a case challenging Washington’s 
sex offender civil commitment statute on double jeopardy grounds, the 
Supreme Court later emphasized that “[w]hether a confinement scheme is 
punitive has been the threshold question for some constitutional challenges” 
to civil commitment schemes.128 This pronouncement includes due process, 
double jeopardy, ex post facto, and self-incrimination challenges.129  
 In answering this threshold question of whether the civil commitment 
system at hand was punitive, the Court in both Allen and Hendricks 
considered the conditions of confinement imposed but ultimately gave scant 
consideration to the fact that the petitioners in both cases were incarcerated 
in prisons (albeit in units segregated from the general population).130 
Whether, and to what extent, the Court should assess the actual conditions 
of confinement imposed by a civil commitment statute when deciding 
whether the statute was in fact punitive was the subject of debate among 
several Justices in Seling. 
 Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence, stated that the Court’s 
precedent “precludes implementation-based challenges at any time.”131 He 
thus argued that only conditions of confinement that are “actually provided 
for on the face of the statute” should be permitted to factor into an analysis 
of whether the statute is punitive.132 In sharp contrast, Justice John Paul 
Stevens in dissent argued that “the question [of] whether a statute is in fact 
punitive cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the 
statute” and argued that the Court’s precedent permits it to take into account 
whether the statute has a punitive effect when deciding whether it is criminal 
 
 125 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368–69. 
 126 Id. at 369. 
 127 531 U.S. 250. 
 128 Id. at 266. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 (“What is significant, however, is that Hendricks was placed 
under the supervision of the Kansas Department of Health and Social and Rehabilitative Services, housed 
in a unit segregated from the general prison population and operated not by employees of the Department 
of Corrections, but by other trained individuals.”); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (“Petitioner 
has not demonstrated, and the record does not suggest, that ‘sexually dangerous persons’ in Illinois are 
confined under conditions incompatible with the State’s asserted interest in treatment.”). 
 131 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 273 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, 101 (1997) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to civil penalties in a banking 
regulations case)). 
 132 Id. 
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or civil in nature.133 Ultimately, the majority left open the possibility that in 
a “first instance determination” of the civil or criminal nature of a 
commitment statute, the Court might look to conditions of confinement.134 
And as described in Part I, a closer look at the actual conditions of sex 
offender civil commitment in states using prison or prison-like facilities 
might well require the Court to reconsider its presumption that such schemes 
are civil. 
C. The Treatment Mandate and Other Constraints 
In the sex offender civil commitment context, then, the Supreme Court 
has consistently declined to find the statutes punitive—a stance scholars have 
roundly critiqued.135 Instead, the Court has emphasized the legislature’s 
treatment and incapacitation goals. This Section considers the constraints 
courts have placed on sex offender civil commitment regimes. 
To begin, the clearest affirmative requirement that lower courts have 
imposed on state sex offender civil commitment programs is that, if 
treatment is possible, it is constitutionally required.136 However, as one 
critical observer of sex offender litigation notes, “[T]he Court has not 
formulated specific requirements for a constitutionally adequate treatment 
program for civilly committed individuals.”137 The lack of a clear standard 
for treatment has left many sex offender civil committees languishing in 
prison conditions without any hope for release138 and suggests that sex 
 
 133 Id. at 275–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 134 See id. at 267 (O’Connor, J., majority opinion). The Court refused to do so in Seling, however, 
because it rejected the “as applied” challenge entirely. Id. 
 135 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 136 See Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement of 
Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1423 (2008); see also Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 
(9th Cir. 2000) (affirming that the Due Process Clause requires that states “provide civilly-committed 
persons with . . . treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released”). But see 
Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that the Eighth Circuit has not adopted the 
perspective that the Due Process Clause requires that states provide “appropriate or effective or 
reasonable treatment of the illness or disability that triggered the patient’s involuntary confinement”). 
 137 Smith, supra note 136, at 1384. Therefore, this general treatment mandate often goes unfulfilled 
in practice. For example, looking to the decades-long litigation in Washington over its civil commitment 
program, see Turay v. Richards, No. 07-35309, 2009 WL 229838, at *1 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the 
district court’s dissolution of a court-imposed injunction requiring that Washington provide 
constitutionally adequate sex offender treatment), although specific treatment mandates were developed 
by the Washington courts, they never achieved compliance with the court-ordered injunction. Smith, 
supra note 136, at 1399–1400, 1407. 
 138 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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offender civil commitment functions more as punishment rather than as a 
form of rehabilitation or treatment.139 
Furthermore, other commentators have argued that the concept of 
“treatment” for civilly committed sex offenders rises to the level of paradox, 
because the same admissions that can help with treatment often extend a 
detainee’s confinement.140 As the Court in Allen made clear, sex offender 
civil commitment proceedings are not subject to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.141 In addition, because a civil 
committee’s statutory privacy protections are also diminished, a sex 
offender’s psychological treatment records may be disclosed in proceedings 
to renew commitment.142 The potential for courtroom disclosure creates 
perverse incentives for civilly committed sex offenders to refuse treatment 
in custody because most treatment programs require participants to “confess 
to additional crimes or admit guilt to sexual transgressions.”143 Indeed, 
treating psychologists may even test the accuracy of participant disclosures 
regarding their past acts and transgressive arousals using polygraph tests.144 
The use of these disclosures in re-commitment hearings thus undermines the 
potential for meaningful treatment behind bars and provides further support 
for the punitive nature of sex offender civil commitment. 
Federal appellate courts have also wrestled with whether certain 
custodial conditions, such as lengthy solitary confinement, violate a civil 
committee’s due process rights. In the Eighth Circuit, for example, the 
constitutionality of solitary confinement practices in a civil commitment 
were challenged on the basis that the placement of a sex offender in isolation 
because of rule infractions violated his procedural due process rights.145 The 
court found the practice constitutional because the plaintiff was given a 
notice and a hearing.146 
 
 139 But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365–68 (1997) (stating that even if the treatment 
provided by a state civil commitment program was “incidental” or “meager,” that this did not threaten 
the constitutionality of the statutory regime). 
 140 See generally Miller, supra note 33, at 2093 (arguing that sex offender treatment, although 
mandated statutorily and constitutionally, remains an “empty promise” in practice because of the perverse 
incentives it engenders). 
 141 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986). 
 142 Miller, supra note 33, at 2108. 
 143 Id. at 2114; see also JOHN HOWARD ASS’N OF ILL., MONITORING VISIT TO BIG MUDDY RIVER 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 4–5 (2013), http://www.thejha.org/sites/default/files/Big%20Muddy% 
20Correctional%20Center%20Report%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J9E-7DTB] (finding that sex 
offenders at a facility in Illinois were avoiding disclosing information necessary for their treatment 
because of fear that such disclosure might result in a later civil commitment hearing). 
 144 Miller, supra note 33, at 2115. 
 145 Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 888 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 146 Id. 
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But, the Seventh Circuit, in West v. Schwebke,147 held that civilly 
committed sex offenders provided evidence sufficient to demonstrate that an 
issue of material fact existed regarding whether employees of the Wisconsin 
Resource Center violated detainees’ substantive due process rights when the 
Center used “therapeutic seclusion” for as many as eighty-two consecutive 
days, or whether it could be reasonably justified on security or treatment 
grounds.148 West gives some indication that the courts may scrutinize extreme 
restrictions on sex offender civil committee liberty. In other words, it 
suggests that some courts are able to countenance that some restrictions on 
civil committees could exceed what can be justified under treatment or 
security rationales.149 
Nevertheless, the federal courts have largely failed to provide 
meaningful guidance as to when restrictions on sex offender civil committees 
cross the line and become unconstitutionally punitive. In particular, whether 
sex offender civil commitment to prison crosses the “punitive” line is the 
subject of continuing disagreement among the circuit courts and is taken up 
in the next Section. 
D. Civil Commitment to Prison and Jails 
This Section examines three instructive cases from three federal 
appellate courts as to whether civil commitment to prison and jails may 
amount to constitutionally prohibited punitive conditions: Allison v. 
Snyder,150 Jones v. Blanas,151 and Matherly v. Andrews.152 These cases reveal 
a divergence in the circuit courts concerning whether civil commitment to 
prison might be found to be objectively punitive, and thus unconstitutional. 
In Allison, a class of sex offenders civilly confined in an Illinois state 
prison, Big Muddy River Correctional Center,153 sued state officials for 
 
 147 333 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 148 See id. at 749. 
 149 See id. (“Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record in this case shows that 
defendants kept plaintiffs in seclusion for periods far exceeding what could be justified by considerations 
of either security or treatment. Now maybe plaintiffs’ experts are wrong, but it will take a trial to sort 
matters out.”). 
 150 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 151 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 152 859 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 153 In 1993, after the Supreme Court decided Allen, the Illinois Department of Corrections designated 
Big Muddy River Correctional Center, a medium-security correctional center, as the unit to house male 
pre-conviction Sexually Dangerous Persons instead of the maximum-security mental health unit at 
Menard Correctional Center discussed in Allen. See JOHN HOWARD ASS’N OF ILL., supra note 143, at 2. 
Women confined under the Illinois Sexual Dangerous Persons Act are held at the main women’s prison 
in Illinois, Logan Correctional Center. As of 2010, sex offenders composed more than half of Big 
Muddy’s total population of 1,900 inmates. Id. The facility is dramatically overcrowded: it was only 
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violation of their substantive due process rights.154 The plaintiffs argued that 
the same Illinois pre-conviction civil commitment statute upheld in Allen, 
the SDPA, was being implemented unconstitutionally in three ways: first, 
committees were confined to a wing of a state prison where they were 
double-celled and mingled with convicts at meals and in other settings; 
second, their treatment involved self-incriminating testimony; and third, 
their therapy was conducted in groups rather than individually.155 The 
plaintiffs did not allege that being confined in prison was unconstitutional 
per se, but instead that they had a right to be placed in the “least restrictive 
environment” consistent with the objectives of SDPA, which required that 
detainees be housed in facilities segregated from the general prison 
population.156 The Seventh Circuit held that while it could not enforce a state 
law provision as the plaintiffs requested, there was relevant federal law in 
play: namely, substantive due process.157 The court affirmed the rule that 
“detainees may be subjected to conditions that advance goals such as 
preventing escape and assuring the safety of others, even though they may 
not be punished.”158 
Nevertheless, the court found for the defendants, holding, in relevant 
part, that “placement in a prison, subject to the institution’s usual rules of 
conduct” does not signify punishment.159 The court based its decision on Bell 
v. Wolfish,160 finding that civil committees, like pretrial jail detainees in Bell, 
“may be held for security reasons but not punished, [and] may be assigned 
to prisons and covered by the usual institutional rules, which are designed to 
assure safety and security.”161 The court emphasized that the plaintiffs “were 
not assigned to high-security institutions, solitary, lockdown, or otherwise 
onerous confinement.”162 
 
designed to hold 952 inmates total. Id. Sexually Dangerous Persons comprised 173 of the 974 sex 
offenders confined at Big Muddy in 2013. Id. at 4. In contrast, Illinois’s post-conviction sex offender civil 
detainees are confined in a “Treatment and Detention Facility” in Rushville, operated by the Department 
of Human Services’ Division of Mental Health Services. DIV. OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., 2008 
Program Review and Evaluation, http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=42716 
[https://perma.cc/2EHA-5N2F]. Illinois has thus created a peculiar dual-system of civil commitment that 
confines post-conviction sex offenders to a “secure treatment facility” operated by the state’s mental 
health department and commits pre-conviction detainees to prison. 
 154 Allison, 332 F.3d at 1076–77. 
 155 See id. at 1078. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. at 1078–80. 
 158 Id. at 1079. 
 159 See id. 
 160 441 U.S. 520, 538–39 (1979). 
 161 See Allison, 332 F.3d at 1079. 
 162 See id. 
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In sum, the court rejected their claims and found that “[p]laintiffs do 
not assert that their situation is worse in any material way than the situation 
in which ordinary pretrial detainees find themselves.”163 The implicit logic 
of the Allison court is that jails, after all, are often indistinguishable from 
prisons in terms of their physical plant and restrictiveness. As such, civil 
commitment to prison does not appear to be any more punitive than the 
conditions that ordinary pretrial detainees find themselves in. However, the 
court largely overlooked one distinguishing factor: sex offender civil 
committees, unlike pretrial detainees, may find themselves in prison-like 
conditions for extremely long periods of time—in some cases, for life.164 
In Allison, the Seventh Circuit drew heavily on Bell for support that 
ordinary detention in prison does not constitute punishment.165 But the 
facility at issue in Bell was a short-term custodial center primarily designed 
to house pretrial detainees.166 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Bell elided 
any significant distinction regarding conditions of confinement depending 
on whether an individual was a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee.167 
The Allison court’s failure to recognize a distinction between conditions 
requirements in jails versus in prisons in these cases suggests an opening for 
the future: if increased scrutiny begins to be applied to conditions endured 
by pretrial detainees, increased scrutiny could be applied to conditions 
experienced by civil committees as well, because neither can be punished. 
In Jones v. Blanas,168 the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion 
as it held that the pretrial civil commitment detention of a sex offender in 
county jail for two years may have violated his substantive due process 
rights.169 Applying the rules from Bell and Youngberg, the Ninth Circuit held 
in Jones that when a sex offender civil detainee is “confined in conditions 
identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than, those in which his criminal 
counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being subjected to 
‘punishment.’”170 Applying this standard to the facts in Jones, the court found 
 
 163 Id. 
 164 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 165 See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 166 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 524. 
 167 Id. at 537 (“Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility 
is to detain.”). 
 168 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 169 Id. at 934. Pretrial civil commitment detention refers to when detainees are held ahead of a civil 
commitment proceeding. See id. at 923 (describing the pretrial detention of Jones prior to his civil 
commitment proceeding under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act). 
 170 Id. at 932 (citing Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2000)). In addition, because 
Jones was still awaiting his civil commitment proceedings, the court stated that the conditions he 
experienced in custody pre-commitment must not be worse than the conditions he would experience post-
commitment. Id. at 932–33 (“[P]urgatory cannot be worse than hell.”). The Ninth Circuit has recently 
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both that the year the civil detainee spent held alongside the general criminal 
population and his year spent in administrative segregation—in which he 
incurred “significant limitations on, or total denials of, recreational activities, 
exercise, phone calls, visitation privileges, out-of-cell time, access to 
religious services, and access to the law library”—presumptively amounted 
to unconstitutional punishment.171 
Unlike in Allison, the Ninth Circuit in Jones thus affirmed that the status 
of pre-adjudication civil committees as noncriminal detainees is critical in 
determining the constitutional parameters of permissible conditions of 
confinement.172 In this way, Jones appears to provide a strong basis for sex 
offenders civilly committed to prison to challenge the conditions of their 
confinement. Indeed, that is exactly what a pro se sex offender civil 
committee (who was detained in a federal prison in North Carolina after 
serving a sentence on a child pornography conviction) recently argued in the 
Fourth Circuit.173 He asked the Fourth Circuit to follow the Jones 
presumption that when civilly committed individuals are detained in 
conditions identical or similar to criminally sentenced prisoners, the 
conditions amount to punishment and are thus unconstitutional.174 The court 
declined to follow Jones’s central holding, positing that, if “[r]ead literally 
and applied to post-adjudication civil detainees,” Jones would create a 
presumption of punishment and would “place[] too great of a burden on 
prison administrators to justify their every move.”175 Such a framework, the 
Fourth Circuit said, would “expand[] the judiciary’s involvement with 
decisions better left to the experts and place[] too much emphasis on 
superficial comparisons between conditions of confinement for civil 
detainees and prisoners.”176 Thus, the circuit courts appear to be torn between 
 
referred to this as the “second” Jones presumption. See King v. County of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 
557 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 171 Jones, 393 F.3d at 934. 
 172 See id. at 931 (critiquing the district court’s application of an Eighth Amendment standard instead 
of the “more protective” Fourteenth Amendment standard that governs conditions of confinement cases 
for pretrial detainees). 
 173 See Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 399 (2017); see 
also supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (discussing the conditions Matherly is subject to in federal 
prison). 
 174 Matherly, 859 F.3d at 275. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 276. The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning here reflects a decades-long trend in the federal 
judiciary: deference to prison bureaucrats’ expert judgment. See David M. Shapiro, To Seek a Newer 
World: Prisoners’ Rights at the Frontier, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 124, 124 (2016). Such 
deference has been frequently critiqued by legal scholars and prisoner rights advocates, who fear that the 
courts have abdicated their constitutional responsibility to safeguard individual rights and to reign in the 
excesses of the carceral state. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, 
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a mandate to protect civil committees from unconstitutional punishment and 
their interest in maintaining maximal bureaucratic discretion for prison 
administrators.  
With the exception of the Ninth Circuit in Jones, federal courts in 
conditions cases have tended to err on the side of prison officials, at the 
expense of civil committees. However, the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Kingsley, which the next Part takes up, may necessitate a change 
in the deference that state prison officials receive when it comes to the 
conditions under which civil detainees—including civilly committed sex 
offenders—may be held. 
III. THE NEW FRONTIER: KINGSLEY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR  
SEX OFFENDERS 
In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s Jones presumption, the Fourth Circuit 
in Matherly assumed that the most recent Supreme Court case bearing on 
this issue was Seling.177 However, in doing so, it overlooked the Court’s 2015 
decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson.178 Kingsley arguably adopted a Jones-
like take on the importance of the civil or criminal status of the detainee.  
This Part examines the Court’s holding in Kingsley and explores its 
potential implications for the constitutionality of civil commitment to prison. 
First, it recalls the facts of Kingsley and the Court’s central holding. Next, it 
explores the implications of Kingsley’s “objective turn” away from an intent-
based punishment test to an objective test for pretrial detainees. Finally, it 
examines how advocates for sex offender civil commitment reform may be 
able to leverage Kingsley in future litigation. 
A. Kingsley: The Facts and Holding 
The facts of Kingsley arose from the experience of a pretrial detainee 
held in a Wisconsin jail. Petitioner Michael Kingsley refused to remove a 
piece of paper covering the light in his cell and, as a consequence, was 
repeatedly tasered in the back by Wisconsin county jail officials while 
handcuffed and lying face down on a bunk.179 Kingsley brought a § 1983 
action against the officials, arguing that the tasering amounted to excessive 
force in violation of his substantive due process rights.180  
 
AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 235 (2016) (summarizing how Supreme Court doctrine reflects a tendency 
to defer to prisons’ symbolic compliance with legal standards at the cost, sometimes, of prisoner rights). 
 177 See Matherly, 859 F.3d at 275 (citing Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)). 
 178 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
 179 Id. at 2470. 
 180 Id. at 2470–71. 
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At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the standard for 
excessive force was a subjective one: it must determine whether force was 
“applied recklessly” and that it was “unreasonable in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the time.”181 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
law required “a subjective inquiry into the officer’s state of mind” and a 
finding that the officer had “an actual intent” to violate a pretrial detainee’s 
rights.182  
At issue in the Supreme Court was whether the proper standard 
governing excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees should be 
different than the subjective standard of excessive force governing claims 
brought by criminally convicted prisoners.183 In other words, the question 
was whether the Court should adopt an objective standard of 
unreasonableness on account of the different status (criminal or civil) of the 
detainee. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court 
overturned the lower courts in holding that the subjective standard applied 
to prisoners’ excessive force claims should not apply to those awaiting trial 
in jail; instead, a pretrial detainee must “show only that the force purposely 
or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”184 
Prisoners’ rights litigator and clinical professor David Shapiro cheered 
the Court’s decision in Kingsley for “lower[ing] the standard for excessive 
force claims brought by pretrial detainees and signal[ing] that current law 
may set the bar too high for other claims as well.”185 He contended, 
moreover, that the impact of Kingsley went beyond making it easier for 
pretrial detainees to bring successful excessive force claims: it may extend 
to jail conditions cases as well.186 Already, Kingsley’s holding has expanded 
to pretrial failure-to-protect cases and conditions cases, where the Ninth 
Circuit187 and Second Circuit188 have found that an objective standard applies 
in those respective circumstances as well.189  
 
 181 Id. at 2471 (emphasis omitted). 
 182 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 183 See id. at 2470. 
 184 Id. at 2473. 
 185 See Shapiro, supra note 176, at 125. 
 186 Id. at 132 (“Kingsley suggests that much of the lower court jurisprudence regarding pretrial 
conditions is wrong because those decisions borrow heavily from Supreme Court precedent regarding 
post-conviction prisoners.”). 
 187 Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 188 Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 189 See Shapiro, supra note 176, at 133. Failure-to-protect cases refer to government liability for 
failure to protect incarcerated persons in prison or jails from the violence of other inmates. See Castro, 
833 F.3d at 1068. In Castro, the plaintiff suffered brain damage after he was beaten unconscious while in 
a Los Angeles jail cell. Id. at 1065. Conditions cases refer to government liability for deliberate 
indifference to substantial risk of harm due to inadequate medical care or living conditions. See Darnell, 
113:155 (2018) Civil Commitment to Prison 
187 
Other scholars have also argued that Kingsley has implications for 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, in that the subjective intent requirement 
for officers should be dispensed when analyzing whether a punishment is 
cruel.190 The expansion of Kingsley’s objective standard to analogous areas 
of law provides strong support that the Court’s holding should not be read 
narrowly. 
B. Kingsley’s Objective Turn 
The doctrinal turn that Kingsley represents may very well reach beyond 
the more typical prisoner conditions cases. The Kingsley Court stated that to 
demonstrate a due process rights violation, “a pretrial detainee can prevail 
by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental 
action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that 
it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”191 Kingsley therefore rejects a 
reading of Bell that suggests “proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required 
for a pretrial detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were 
violated.”192  
Instead, Kingsley invites lower courts to focus on the “objective” 
conditions that may or may not constitute punishment, with an eye toward 
those restrictions on detainee liberty that may be “excessive” in relation to 
the legitimate security concerns of state institutions. Moreover, courts post-
Kingsley will need to distinguish more clearly between governmental action 
in pretrial versus post-conviction settings because they must now apply 
different standards in the different contexts. 
In this way, Kingsley’s logic may necessitate revisiting holdings 
governing the legality of sex offender civil commitment regimes. For 
example, Kingsley may require courts to no longer give such broad deference 
to the legislature’s “intent” in determining whether a civil commitment 
scheme is punitive or not. Historically, the Court has held that where a state 
has expressly proclaimed that commitment proceedings are “civil” versus 
 
849 F.3d at 20. In Darnell, twenty state pretrial detainees brought suit for appalling conditions 
experienced in Brooklyn Central Booking post-arrest. Id. 
 190 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Cruel, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 494 n.314 (2017) 
(arguing that post-Kingsley, “[t]here is no requirement that the official have any particular state of mind 
concerning the excessiveness of the force. Similarly, there is no requirement under the original meaning 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that a public official have a particular state of mind 
concerning the cruelty of a punishment.”). 
 191 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2015) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 192 See id. at 2473. Indeed, in dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia forcefully stated that there was an intent-
to-punish requirement for Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims. See id. at 2477 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“Conditions amount to punishment, we explained, when they are ‘imposed for the purpose 
of punishment.’” (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979))). 
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“criminal,” a plaintiff is required to provide “the clearest proof that the 
statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect” to overcome the 
strong presumption that the statute is in fact civil.193 The Court has 
consistently left open the possibility that the actual conditions of detention 
could be so punitive as to provide adequate evidence of the legislature’s 
punitive intent, but no plaintiff has yet satisfied this “heavy burden.”194 In 
effect, Kingsley may lower the burden for sex offender civil committees to 
prove that their confinement is unconstitutionally punitive by shifting the 
attention away from punitive intent and toward an objective test of punitive 
conditions. 
C. Implications for Future Civil Commitment Litigation 
Kingsley’s doctrinal turn opens up a new avenue for sex offender civil 
commitment litigation and an opportunity to bolster ongoing cases in two 
main ways. First, Kingsley’s emphasis on analyzing the “challenged 
governmental action” primarily, rather than on the existence of a state 
“intent” to punish,195 suggests that courts could sidestep the issue of the 
legislature’s intent entirely.196 The logic of Kingsley instructs courts to 
instead focus directly on the question of whether the actual conditions of 
confinement are so restrictive as to be “excessive” in light of their non-
penological purpose as to render the detainment scheme unconstitutional.197 
In other words, Kingsley’s logic dictates that conditions of confinement are 
no longer only relevant to the extent that they shed light on a hidden 
legislative punitive purpose; rather, conditions may simply be so punitive as 
to themselves be unconstitutional. 
Thus, the Kingsley holding implies that when challenging conditions of 
civil confinement, the most relevant question is whether such restrictions are 
excessive with regard to the security rationale. The case highlights the notion 
that most restrictive conditions that civil detainees find themselves in may 
almost always have a “rational” relation to a non-penological purpose (i.e., 
institutional security) but nevertheless may be excessively (and thus 
unconstitutionally) restrictive. It is difficult to imagine the post-Kingsley 
 
 193 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 194 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (“Although we recognize that a civil 
label is not always dispositive, we will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a party 
challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose 
or effect as to negate the state’s intention to deem it civil.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
 195 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74. 
 196 Although legislative intent was not at issue in Kingsley, but rather executive intent in the 
application of force to prisoners, the inquiry is analogous. 
 197 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74. 
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Court affirming a decision like that in Hargett, where the court stated in a 
single breath that restrictions—from locked cell doors to invasive searches—
on sex offender civil committees may indeed be “excessive” given the 
patient population, but nevertheless were constitutional because they did not 
represent a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.198 
Second, Kingsley affirms a long-standing principle that conditions of 
pretrial confinement should be meaningfully distinguished from those of 
criminal incarceration. A lower court considering a case like Allison in a 
post-Kingsley universe may no longer be able to hold that there is no 
constitutional problem with pretrial detainees living out indefinite sentences 
in conditions identical to those of post-conviction prisoners if such high-
security conditions are not rationally related to a legitimate, nonpunitive, 
governmental purpose or if they are excessive in relation to that purpose. If 
Kingsley stands for the general proposition that post-conviction conditions 
of confinement are no longer constitutionally equal to pre-conviction 
conditions of confinement, then there may be a strong argument that civilly 
committed sex offenders cannot, as a matter of law, be committed to state 
prison facilities. Such conditions may be per se punitive and thus per se 
unconstitutional.199 This line of reasoning is bolstered by Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence more generally, which has long recognized that incarceration 
in prisons is a central vehicle whereby society punishes court-adjudicated 
criminals.200 As a matter of principle, this assertion may be better founded 
than ever before thanks to the Court’s holding in Kingsley. 
Framing sex offender civil detainees as primarily “pretrial detainees” 
rather than as “patients” may—although somewhat counterintuitively—be 
strategic for advocates. Although Youngberg’s declaration of substantive 
rights for civil committees201 appears on the surface to be a more promising 
doctrine in which to flesh out greater protections for sex offenders than Bell’s 
 
 198 Hargett v. Adams, No. 02 C 1456, 2005 WL 399300, at *15–16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2005). For an 
extended discussion of Hargett, see supra Section I.B.2. 
 199 At the very least, such commitment schemes would appear to be presumptively punitive and thus 
unconstitutional under a Jones-like standard applied to the conditions of commitment (rather than of 
pretrial detention). 
 200 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“These elementary principles establish the 
government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 201 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (“We repeat that the State concedes a duty 
to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. . . . The State also has the unquestioned 
duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution. And it may not 
restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure 
such safety or to provide needed training.”). 
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prohibition on punishment of pretrial detainees,202 there is no parallel 
opening in Supreme Court doctrine in the civil commitment context 
comparable to that of Kingsley. When challenges are brought under 
Youngberg and its progeny, such as in Hargett, lower courts seem willing to 
bend over backwards to find that even the most extreme restrictions on 
detainees are supported by “professional judgment.”203  
On the other hand, Bell and its lineage, which includes Kingsley, focus 
judicial oversight on the question of whether custodial restrictions are 
rationally connected to a nonpunitive purpose and whether such restrictions 
appear to be excessive in relation to the alternative purpose supporting 
them.204 Asking courts to overturn decades of their own precedent upholding 
the (albeit questionable) constitutionality of both pre- and post-conviction 
sex offender civil commitment-to-prison regimes is no small request. Yet, 
bolstered by fresh precedent by the Supreme Court itself, as well as the logic 
of Ninth and Second Circuits’ cases like Jones, Castro, and Darnell, such 
challenges may stand a chance. 
The Kingsley opening is crucial because court-based challenges to 
punitive civil commitment regimes may be the only viable route to 
constitutional reform. Despite the availability of potential alternative 
methods of protecting the public and respecting the constitutional rights of 
sex offenders (e.g., through nonpunitive civil treatment programs),205 
because sex offenders tend to be categorically reviled in popular culture, it 
is not likely that state legislatures will undergo such reform efforts 
 
 202 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions 
or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without 
due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of 
the detainee. For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication 
of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”). 
 203 See supra Sections I.B.2 and II.D for a discussion of the lower courts’ deference to prison 
officials’ professional judgment. 
 204 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (“A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose 
of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a 
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination 
generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 205 Although the civil institutions that involuntarily confine the mentally ill or intellectually disabled 
are not without their own constitutional problems, see, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) 
(holding unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that permitted the continued confinement of an insanity 
acquittee even after the hospital review committee found no lasting evidence of mental illness); O’Connor 
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding unconstitutional the continued civil commitment of a mental 
patient who was capable of living safely in the community by himself or with the help of willing and 
responsible family or friends), they do not run as great of a risk of constituting impermissible punishment 
as state civil commitment to prison does because hospital conditions do not as closely resemble the 
conditions of criminal punishment. 
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voluntarily.206 Counter-majoritarian constitutional litigation will remain a 
key element of the battle to make sex offender civil commitment conform to 
longstanding legal principles that prohibit preventative detention, double 
jeopardy, and loss of liberty without due process of law. Given how 
piecemeal reform litigation can be and the opening that Kingsley has 
provided, advocates may do well to consider attacking the constitutionality 
of civil commitment to prison as a credible first step. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note began by charting the current punitive landscape of sex 
offender civil commitment detention conditions by conducting a nationwide 
survey of commitment statutes. The survey revealed that over a dozen states 
either explicitly commit sex offender civil committees to prison or authorize 
such an agreement. Moreover, by looking at class action litigation at the 
district court level, this Note revealed that the line between prisons and non-
prison “secure treatment facilities” is neither a clear nor necessarily 
defensible one. Reviewing the Supreme Court’s civil commitment, pretrial 
detention, and sex offender jurisprudence, the Note highlighted how such 
clearly punitive detention schemes have been upheld as “civil” by the Court 
because of its focus on legislative intent as opposed to the objective 
conditions of confinement. Finally, the Note argues that the Court’s recent 
decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson offers a chance to shift the focus away 
from legislative intent and toward the objective reality that sex offender civil 
committees find themselves in when they are detained behind bars, in 
prisons, for indefinite periods of time. 
Fundamentally, this Note argues that civil commitment to prison is a 
practice that impermissibly muddles the foundational division in 
constitutional law between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings and 
between treatment and punishment. To the extent that this Note sheds light 
on the existence of this phenomenon, it does so in the hope that the courts 
might be ready—after years of refusing to consider the actual punitive reality 
of confinement of the many sex offender civil committees who find 
themselves behind bars—to examine state and federal sex offender civil 
commitment regimes more closely. If the opening that Kingsley provides is 
indeed big enough to bring light—and scrutiny—to this dark corner of our 
penal system, it is an opportunity that advocates should not overlook. 
  
 
 206 See RICKARD, supra note 47, at 2 (“Like crime in general, child sex abuse has been described as 
a ‘valence issue’ in that there is no pro-crime or pro-sex offender lobby.” (citation omitted)). 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: RESULTS OF NATIONAL SURVEY OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL  
COMMITMENT STATUTES 
 
 207 Colorado does permit, however, the imposition of an indeterminate, lifetime criminal sentence to 
certain sex offenders. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-904 (West 2013). 
 208 Although Idaho does not have a separate sex offender civil commitment statute, it does put 
limitations on the ability of those convicted of sex offenses to be paroled without an additional 
psychological examination. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-223(4) (West 2016). 
State Sex Offender Civil 
Commitment Statute 
Facility Type 
Alabama none n/a 
Alaska none n/a 
Arizona Arizona Sexually Violent Persons Act ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707 (2014) 
state hospital or least 
restrictive alternative 
Arkansas none n/a 
California 
California Sexually Violent  
Predators Act 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 
2018) 
secure state hospital 
facility on the grounds 
of Department of 
Corrections  
Colorado207 none n/a 
Connecticut none n/a 
Delaware none n/a 
Florida 
Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil 
Commitment for Sexual Violent 
Predators’ Treatment and Care Act 




Children and Families 
authority; inter-agency 
and private contracts 
authorized; 
requirement that sex 
offenders be 
segregated from other 
patients 
Georgia none n/a 
Hawaii none n/a 
Idaho208 none n/a 
Illinois 
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 
(pre-conviction) 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8 (West 
2017) 
 
Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act 
(post-conviction) 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40 (West 
2017) 
prison operated by 
Department of 
Corrections; may 
place person in 
custody of other 
department or agency 
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 209 Because of ongoing class action litigation challenging the constitutionality of its sex offender 
civil commitment program, Minnesota’s commitment scheme is in currently in flux. See Karsjens v. 
Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub. nom., Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017), 
reh’g en banc denied, No. 15-3485 (Feb. 22, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106 (2017). Although 
Minnesota’s sex offender civil commitment program was initially held unconstitutional in federal district 
court, the Eighth Circuit reversed and withdrew an injunction on the program. 
secure treatment 
center operated by 
Department of Human 
Services or least 
restrictive alternative 
(post-conviction) 
Indiana none n/a 
Iowa 
Iowa Sexually Violent Predators Act 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7 (West 2014) 
secure facility 
operated by 
Department of Human 
Services; inter-agency 
and private contracts 
authorized; 
requirement that sex 
offenders be 
segregated from other 
patients 
Kansas 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (West 
2008) 
secure facility 
operated by the 







requirement that sex 
offenders be 
segregated from other 
patients 
Kentucky none n/a 
Louisiana none n/a 
Maine none n/a 
Maryland none n/a 
Massachusetts 
Care, Treatment and Rehabilitation of 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 2 
(West 2017) 
secure treatment 
center operated by 
Department of 
Correction 
Michigan none n/a 
Minnesota209 
Minnesota Commitment and Treatment 
Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and 
Sexual Psychopathic Personalities 
secure treatment 
facility operated by 
state Sex Offender 
Program 
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MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253D.07 (West 
2015) 




MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 2014) 
secure treatment 
facility operated by 
the Department of 
Mental Health; inter-
agency contract with 
the Department of 
Corrections 
authorized; 
requirement that sex 
offenders be 
segregated from other 
patients 
Montana none n/a 
Nebraska 
Sexual Offender Commitment Act 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1209 (West 
2009)  
state hospital or least 
restrictive alternative 
Nevada None n/a 
New 
Hampshire 
Involuntary Civil Commitment of 
Sexually Violent Predators Act 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 135-E:8, 135-
E:11 (West 2015) 
secure psychiatric unit 
of prison operated by 
the Department of 
Corrections; inter-
agency and private 
contracts authorized 
New Jersey 
New Jersey Sexually Violent  
Predator Act 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.34 (West 
2016) 
secure facility 
operated by the 
Department of 
Corrections 
New Mexico none n/a 
New York 
Sex Offenders Requiring Civil 
Commitment or Supervision 
N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 10.10 
(McKinney 2011) 
secure treatment 




corrections, or other 
government entity; 
inter-agency contract 
with the Department 




North Carolina none n/a 
North Dakota 
Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Dangerous Individuals 




facility operated by 
Department of Human 
Services; if previously 
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 210 Oregon has a statue permitting the treatment of “sexually dangerous persons” in the Department 
of Corrections, but it is limited to criminally convicted sex offenders serving sentences. See OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 426.675 (West 2011). 
 211 Pennsylvania’s statute is limited to juveniles. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6401 
(2013). 
 212 Vermont requires, however, indeterminate life sentences, with release conditional upon 
completing sex offender treatment for those convicted of sex offenses. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3271 
(West 2007). 
in prison, may be 




Ohio none n/a 
Oklahoma none n/a 
Oregon210 none n/a 
Pennsylvania211 
Court-Ordered Involuntary Treatment of 
Certain Sexually Violent Persons 
42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6403 (West 2013) 
inpatient treatment 
facility designated by 
Department of Public 
Welfare  
Rhode Island none n/a 
South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act S.C. CODE ANN. § 44–48–100 (2018) 
secure facility 
operated by 
Department of Mental 
Health; inter-agency 




requirement that sex 
offenders be 
segregated from other 
patients  
South Dakota none n/a 
Tennessee none n/a 
Texas 
Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 841.0831 (West 2017) 
tiered treatment 
program from total 
confinement to less 
restrictive housing 
operated by Civil 
Commitment Office  
Utah none n/a 
Vermont212 none n/a 
Virginia 
Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators 




Behavioral Health and 
Developmental 
Services; inter-agency 
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 213 The relevant D.C. commitment statute is ambiguous with regard to facility type, specifying only 
that commitment may be to “an institution,” D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3808 (2017), but subsequent court 
decisions reveal that in practice commitment under this statute was to “mental hospitals,” see Shelton v. 
United States, 721 A.2d 603, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1998), or to a “hospital,” see Malone v. Overholzer, 93 F. 
Supp. 647, 647 (D.D.C. 1950). 
 214 The authority of the federal government to enact this civil commitment scheme was upheld in 
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 149 (2010). 
 215 The U.S. Department of Justice, however, houses its Sex Offender Commitment and Treatment 
Program at FCI Butner in North Carolina, a prison psychiatric facility that also houses other criminally 
sentenced prisoners. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, BUTNER, NORTH 
CAROLINA, DOCTORAL PSYCHOLOGY INTERNSHIP 2018/2019 8 (Jul. 28, 2017). The United States’ civil 
commitment of sex offenders to prison was recently challenged on the basis that conditions were “more 
restrictive than, identical to, or similar to conditions applicable to prisoners housed at FCI Butner,” but 
was upheld in Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 399 
(2017). 
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